

**PUBLIC COPY**

**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**

Citizenship and Immigration Services

**identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy**

*ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE*

*CIS, AAO, 20 Mass. 3/F*

*425 I Street N.W.*

*Washington, D.C. 20536*

File: WAC 02 275 52263 Office: California Service Center

Date: **MAR 09 2004**

IN RE: Petitioner:  
Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER


**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a laminating and copper plating firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a copper plater. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition.

On appeal, counsel argues that the director erred in concluding that the petitioner did not demonstrate an ability to pay the prevailing wage.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Eligibility in this matter hinges on the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered as of the petitioner's priority date, which is the date the request for labor certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor, and continuing until the alien is granted permanent residence. The petitioner's priority date in this instance is February 20, 2001. The beneficiary's salary as stated

on the labor certification is \$11.71 per hour or \$24,356.80 per year.

With the petition, counsel submitted copies of the petitioner's 2001 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation.

In a request for evidence (RFE) dated December 18, 2002, the director requested the original computer printouts from the IRS of tax returns filed in 2001 and 2002, and copies of the petitioner's quarterly wage reports for California for the past four quarters. In response, counsel submitted copies of petitioner's 2001 and 2002 tax returns stamp dated by the IRS and the California quarterly wage reports for 2002.

The director determined that the evidence did not establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage from the time the priority date was established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful residency.

On appeal, counsel states that because the established priority date is early 2001, analysis of the ability to pay must include the petitioner's net income for the year 2000. Counsel argues that the petitioner has nearly \$1 million of assets which could be used or considered in the analysis of ability to pay, and that the president of petitioner has committed his personal assets to payment of the proffered wage.

With the appeal, counsel submitted a brief, a copy of petitioner's federal tax return for the year 2000 reflecting the petitioner had ordinary income from business activities of \$166,365, and copies of petitioner's unaudited profit and loss statements for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Unaudited financial reports are of little evidentiary value because they are based solely on the representations of management. The regulation neither states nor implies that an *unaudited* document may be submitted in lieu of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

The petitioner's tax return for calendar year 2001 shows ordinary income from trade or business activities of \$105,042. The petitioner could have paid the proffered wage from taxable income.

The petitioner's tax return for calendar year 2002 shows ordinary income from trade or business activities of \$5,872. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage from the taxable income. The return also shows current assets of \$4825 and current liabilities of \$802. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage from net current assets.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine the net income reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by both CIS and judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *Aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court also held that CIS, then the Immigration and Naturalization Service, had properly relied upon the petitioner's net income, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Id.* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses rather than net income.

Additionally, CIS does not consider the petitioner's long-term assets and liabilities in evaluating its ability to pay the proffered wage, as it does not assume or expect the petitioner will sell those assets in order to pay the proffered wage.

Contrary to counsel's assertion, CIS may not "pierce the corporate veil" and look to the assets of the corporation's owner to satisfy the corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. See *Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner is obliged by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The evidence submitted does not demonstrate that the petitioner was able to pay the proffered wage during 2001. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it has had the continuing ability to pay the proffered salary beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The

petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.